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The increasing necessity of engaging in social interaction through online commercial 
providers such as Facebook, alongside the ability of providers to extract, aggregate, analyse 
and commercialise the data and metadata such activities produce, have attracted 
considerable attention amongst the media and academic commentators alike.  While much 
of the attention has been focussed on the data mining of social networking services such as 
Facebook, it is equally important to recognise the widespread adoption of large-scale data 
mining practices in a number of realms, including social games such as the well-known 
Farmville and its sequels, created by Zynga. The implicit contract that the public who use 
these services necessarily engage requires them to trade information about their friends, 
their likes, their desires and their consumption habits in return for their participation in the 
service. This paper will critically explore the realm of social games utilising Zynga as a central 
example, with a view to examine the practices, politics and ethics of data mining and the 
inherent social media contradiction. In determining whether this contradiction is accidental 
or purposeful, this paper will ask, in effect, whether Zynga and other big data miners behind 
social games are entrepreneurial heroes, more sinister FarmVillains, or whether it is possible 
at all to draw a line between the two? In doing so, Zynga’s data mining approach and 
philosophy provide an important indicator about the broader integration of data analytics 
into a range of everyday activities. 
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The increasingly complex intermingling of online social interactions and data mining that take place 
through social media, web search and online games necessitates further discussion and examination.  
Both activities – the increasing necessity of engaging in social interaction through online commercial 
providers such as Facebook, alongside the ability of providers to extract, aggregate and 
commercialise the outcomes of such activities as a result of the data trail that is produced – have 
attracted considerable attention amongst the media and academic commentators alike.  The implicit 
contract that the public who use these services necessarily engage requires them to trade 
information about their friends, their likes, their desires and their consumption habits in return for 
their participation in the service. The release of Facebook’s Graph Search functionality makes this 
trade off quite explicit, demonstrating how multifaceted data mining of social interactions creates 
complex, useful and importantly marketable information.  
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The dramatic rise in the creation and exploitation of what is now called big data leads to a range of 
ethical questions, not least of all being the transparency of data mining operations (boyd & 
Crawford, 2012). While much of the attention has been focussed on social networking services such 
as Facebook, it is equally important to recognise the widespread adoption of large-scale data mining 
practices in a number of realms, including social games such as the well-known Farmville and its 
many sequels and clones, created by Zynga. In examining data mining in social games, the question 
must be asked as to whether users are making a fair exchange – trading a full record of their every 
choice, click and action for mostly free gameplay – or is this choice so occluded that users are 
insufficiently aware of the exchange they have legally agree to, usually via impenetrably dense 
Terms of Service? Moreover, is this example indicative of a broader social media contradiction which 
sees users largely focused on the social side, which is usually about ephemeral communication and 
sharing, while the online service providers tend to focus on the media side, which entails lasting, 
durable and minable information and data (Leaver & Lloyd, 2015; Leaver, 2013).  This paper will 
critically explore the realm of social games utilising Zynga as a central example, with a view to 
examine the practices, politics and ethics of data mining and the inherent social media contradiction. 
In determining whether this contradiction is accidental or purposeful, this paper will ask, in effect, 
whether Zynga and other big data miners behind many social games are entrepreneurial heroes, 
more sinister FarmVillains, or whether it is possible at all to draw a line between the two? 
The broader aim of this paper is not to single out Zynga because their approach to big data mining is 
unique, but rather to examine Zynga’s practices as they exemplify the way analytics are being 
integrated into and utilised in a rapidly expanding range of fields. As those fields grow, the opacity 
surrounding the way individual data is used grows more and more problematic. For example, while 
personal fitness trackers such as Fitbit are ostensibly about self-tracking and self-improvement, 
insurance companies are already offering discounts to surveyed Fitbit users whose activities fall into 
a particular range that the company deems healthy (Bernard, 2015). Moreover, aggregated Fitbit 
activity has also featured in a recent course case, where a Fitbit user sought to demonstrate how 
their activity deviated from personal and statistical norms due to the severity of injuries they 
suffered (Crawford, 2014). Fitbit users may not necessarily know that their personal data is being 
aggregated to produce statistical norms, nor have necessarily consider the impact of having a health 
data trail on their insurance costs, but at least in using their devices and examining their own 
personalised data reports, they have clear indicators that their use generates data which is stored 
and analysed in a variety of ways. The importance of examining Zynga’s approach to big data 
analytics is both due to the company’s high profile, and their disingenuousness on the one hand 
purporting to be a games company while company executives openly touted that they were running 
an analytics corporation whose main product happened to be social games. In making more visible 
the data analytics driving Zynga, the company’s dramatic rise and equally notable decline provides a 
useful indicator and warning about the use and ethics of big data mining. 
Zynga and social games 
Our lives are increasingly enacted through technologies and systems capable of capturing, archiving, 
matching and analysing what we do and how we do it, producing complex and rich data sets that are 
seen as an extremely desirable resource in commercial, political and security realms. As the 2013 
revelations about PRISM and the NSA surveillance practices demonstrate, this resource is 
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understood as capable of producing information about a customisable range of practices and also 
potential practices, built upon data matching, profiling, association rules and so forth (Lyon, 2014). 
Perhaps what is surprising is in fact, not that surveillance, data capture and analysis was taking place, 
but that people were so stunned at the revelations that the NSA was unable to ignore such an 
attractive potential resource.  Yet while outrage that has been expressed about government agency 
practices, with occasional notable exceptions (Arthur, 2014) people seem disturbed but less 
concerned about the practices of the private sector which in many ways is less regulated and 
accountable than that of state agencies. 
Perhaps one of the clearest instances where data mining by corporations is applied is the area of 
social gaming. Social games, which are games played via social networking platforms such as 
Facebook, are increasingly popular, with hundreds of millions of cumulative players. Game company 
Zynga, with a raft of well-known games including Farmville and Mafia Wars, boasted more than 300 
million actively monthly users at the company’s peak in the third quarter of 2012 (Statista, 2014). 
Despite making some of their profit via advertising – the default revenue stream for most online 
services – Zynga’s profitability has rested on the sale of virtual goods within their games. In figuring 
out how to best position users to desire virtual goods, Zynga has been at the forefront of data 
mining: at a 2010 presentation, Vice President of Analytics and Platform Technologies Ken Rudin 
stated outright that Zynga is ‘an analytics company masquerading as a games company’ (Rudin, 
2010). And it’s a masquerade that is very successful, given that few Farmville players, for instance, 
are likely to consider how their every movement and mouse-click is being algorithmically studied 
and filtered to increase the odds that they will part with real cash for virtual goods in future 
gameplay.  
Zynga was founded in 2007 by CEO Mark Pincus with the underlying goal of implementing profitable 
games using user-pays principles. However, unlike the more traditional subscription model used by 
game companies, Zynga’s social games are free to play but offer the option of micro-transaction 
purchases within the games that can help with game progression, virtual good acquisition, 
decorative or personalised attributes and so forth.  These micro-transactions involve relatively small 
sums of money, yet cumulatively, their revenue can be quite substantial. In December 2012, for 
example, Facebook which at that time took a percentage of revenue income from its third party 
users/developers revealed that Zynga accounted for 12% of Facebook total profits in 2011.  
According to Facebook, this amount “was comprised of revenue derived from payments processing 
fees related to Zynga’s sales of virtual goods and from direct advertising purchased by Zynga. 
Additionally, Zynga’s apps generate a significant number of pages on which we display ads from 
other advertisers.” Facebook  goes on to note, almost prophetically,  “If the use of Zynga games on 
our Platform declines, if Zynga launches games on or migrates games to competing platforms, or if 
we fail to maintain good relations with Zynga, we may lose Zynga as a significant Platform developer 
and our financial results may be adversely affected” (Facebook quoted in Kain, 2012). 
The “symbiotic relationship” between Zynga and Facebook in particular was vital for Zynga’s initial 
success (Goggin, 2014, p. 11). According to Pincus, “Our games are instantly social because of 
Facebook. That’s an amazing, magical thing that they provide” (Duryee, 2012).  Zynga games utilise 
the resource that these SNS provide – access to people’s social networks. In this way, Zynga are able 
to draw on ready-made, captive audiences and their networks of users who may be looking to 
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engage in additional activities amongst themselves. These ready-made networks also offer another 
element that has been vital for Zynga’s success – virality or an effective means of word of mouth 
referral, with a range of different messaging and notification options allowing Farmville players to let 
their Facebook friends know they were playing the game, and would happily invite new players from 
their Facebook ‘friends’ to play, too (Kastensmidt, 2010, p. 198). 
In order to maximise their game revenue, Zynga has been involved in extensive data mining of player 
activities in games as well as their social network interactions. Data mining involves the extraction of 
information on the basis of individual’s personal information as well as on user behaviour patterns: 
whether users and social groups are more likely to engage in some sorts of practices, whether they 
are more likely to refer to others under particular circumstances, whether they are more likely to be 
induced to spend money under particular circumstances. Data mining, in association with the 
expanding abilities of technologies and processes to rapidly match, compare and calculate large data 
sets opens up a Pandora’s box of possibilities previously unknown or  impossibly time consuming to 
undertake (Leaver, Willson, and Balnaves, 2012).  Data mining is undertaken to identify patterns and 
associations that can be used to help guide game design in order to enhance playing experience 
(Ansari, Talreja,  and Desai, 2012), and it can be used to identify and harness player desires and 
wallets.  Aggregated data containing personal information and social practices can also be a valuable 
source of income when sold to those who make their business out of the on-sale of tailored data 
sets (e.g. companies such as Axciom). Increasingly, the challenge is in ensuring consumers, users and 
players recognise their value to these companies: 
 we must come to terms with our own online activities feeding the appetites of 
algorithmically-driven machines designed to facilitate the expansion of profit and power by 
quantifying and modulating our desires. We’ve become more valuable to the Internet and its 
scanbots as aggregate data inputs than we ever were as consumers of banner ads. (McKelvey, 
Tiessen & Simcoe, 2013) 
Indeed, in social games, the value is not just derived from each player, but also from the reach of 
their existing social networks: 
Every mouse click aggregates onto a wider body of data that is stored indefinitely, to be 
queried and analyzed to ends that are boundless at most, and vague at the very least. A social 
network game can take advantage of a user’s extant network to send invitations to join him or 
her by signing up for the game, thereby authorizing the application to access the user’s 
information.  The data from those interactions can be an alternative to straight monetization, 
as users can receive virtual goods when they invite friends who sign up.   (Chow-White, P., 
Chee, F., & Smith, R. 2011, p.18) 
The Contract 
Unlike the NSA capturing and using personal information, which has been illicit and largely 
undertaken without direct consent from the sources of that information, social game users do 
accede to their information being accessed. At least, they might click on a box saying they agree to 
the Terms of Service and privacy policy of the provider, or that proceeding after being notified 
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implies consent. Thus in principle, it can be argued that they are fully cognisant and indeed complicit 
in these activities.  
But are the realities quite as straightforward as this? Terms of Service are lengthy, often full of 
complex detail and also, in the case of their being situated within other platforms that have their 
own Terms of Service (as Facebook does), then almost impossible to decipher what this cross 
relationship might mean in terms of user data (DeNicola, 2012). It is worth quoting some extracts 
from Zynga’s Terms of Service at length, both because they make obvious the impossibility of 
deciphering exactly what they mean but also because though they are not easily accessible, it is clear 
that they claim the right to do anything with the material that users provide both now and also any 
possible future uses yet unknown. This latter inclusion means that they effectively grant an open 
licence to yet unknown data matching and data mining possibilities indefinitely: 
You own your User Content. You hereby grant Zynga and its Affiliates a perpetual and 
irrevocable (other than as provided below), worldwide, fully paid-up and royalty free, non-
exclusive, unlimited license, including the right to sublicense and assign to third parties, and 
right to copy, reproduce, fix, adapt, modify, improve, translate, reformat, create derivative 
works from, manufacture, introduce into circulation, commercialize, publish, distribute, sell, 
license, sublicense, transfer, rent, lease, transmit, publicly display, publicly perform, or provide 
access to electronically, broadcast, communicate to the public by telecommunication, display, 
perform, enter into computer memory, and use and practice, in any way now known or in the 
future discovered, your User Content as well as all modified and derivative works thereof in 
connection with our provision of the Service, including marketing and promotions thereof. To 
the extent permitted by applicable laws, you hereby waive any moral rights you may have in 
any User Content. The license you grant Us to use user posted content (except any content 
you submit in response to Zynga promotions and competitions or any other content 
specifically solicited by Zynga) ends when you delete your User Content or you close your 
Account unless your User Content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted it. 
However, you understand and accept that removed content may persist in back-up copies for 
a reasonable period of time. (http://company.zynga.com/legal/terms-of-service) 
When faced with whether to acquiesce to Zynga’s Terms of Service including its privacy policy, users 
are given  a stark choice – either they acquiesce in total and give away access to the requested 
information and any further information as to their in-game and across-platform activities or they 
don’t play the game; the game many of their friends may be playing. Without even going into the 
issue of the degree to which users may understand the implications of giving away their data for 
playing privileges, they must also reconcile their ability to be part of a group and a conversation 
about shared activities, or to be excluded. Indeed, they cannot even look at the game in order to 
determine whether they are interested without agreeing to a data trade-off. 
The Terms of Service noted above come from Zynga.com, the website established by Zynga as a way 
to bypass the need to access their games through a SNS, a need which became pressing when the 
relationship with Facebook soured in 2012 and Zynga lost their unofficial status as Facebook’s 
preferred social games network (“Facebook and Zynga to end close relationship,” 2012). As 
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suggested above, the matter of transparency and Terms of Service is even more complex when an 
app is nested within another provider with their own Terms of Service. In the case of Facebook, 
when accessing Farmville via Facebook, users are not required to read either the Terms of Service, 
nor the Privacy Policy from Zynga, but can get straight into the game after clicking a single 
confirmation screen. When accessing an app on Facebook, therefore, users do not even have to click 
that they agree, but simply push the ‘Play Game’ button; access is thus read as consent: 
Figure 1. Farmville Terms of Service and Privacy Policy consent button on Facebook. 
As with most Facebook apps, the confirmation screen to access Farmville and other social games 
outlines what Facebook data will be shared with the makers of the app, and what permissions the 
app will have to post material to the user’s Facebook timeline, but the actual information regarding 
the data that will be shared, stored and mined by Zynga are carefully occluded, appear in fine print – 
a tiny font – on a click-through style screen that most users habitually ignore or agree to with 
minimal cognitive engagement, if any. These Terms are examples of what Lane DeNicola (2012, p. 
274) describes as a “cultural opacity” where the combination of the legal terms, the way they are 
positioned (basically near-hidden), and the platform context all work against a user ever seriously 
engaging with, or even reading, the impenetrable legal terms which bind their use.  
Recent research investigating data sharing and mobile applications has demonstrated that even 
when a user is conscious of the likelihood of their personal data being mined, they have rarely 
considered the full range of ways in which data they have generated is being stored, aggregated and 
analysed. For example, surveyed users of the popular casual mobile game Angry Birds who had 
thought themselves well informed about privacy were surprised just how much data Rovio collected 
about them in order to target advertising in the free versions of these popular games (Balebako, 
Jung, Lu, Cranor, and Nguyen, 2013). Given that Zynga have consciously and publicly styled 
6 
 
themselves as an analytics company, extrapolating various forms of value and currency from 
aggregated user activities, the absolute paucity of the notifications about the sort of material 
collected, stored and analysed is highly questionable.  
In Benjamin Burroughs’ (2012) examination of types of play in Farmville, he concludes that for most 
players: “The combined space of Facebook and FarmVille is perhaps best described then as a liminal 
space where players engage with a low-level of entry for the purposes of decompressing and 
transitioning from the complexities of modernity” (Burroughs, 2012, p. 19).  If social games really are 
the equivalent of crashing on the sofa and channel surfing, the lack of information about Zynga’s 
data analytics are even more likely to slip under the radar. Moreover, if the motivators for joining 
Farmville or another game are social, then a user will likely be focused on the communication and 
competitive elements of a game, often to the exclusion of any meaningful consideration of the 
generative labour (i.e. the creation of minable data) they are enacting on Zynga’s behalf (Terranova, 
2000). And while the exchange of an initially free game app may imply that some sort of exchange 
must be taking place in terms of user activity, Zynga never explicitly acknowledges to players that 
the recording and analyzing of player activity is building an ever more complex and vast amalgam of 
big data that is being used to refine the games both to attract ongoing player interaction and 
position those users as more likely to part with real money to purchase gameplay enhancing virtual 
goods.  
Questionable practices: Zynga and its relationship with (personal) data 
Zynga’s reputation in relation to its use of information and its commercial practices has been 
questioned many times. Indeed, CEO Mark Pincus acknowledges that the company has engaged in 
dubious practices. According to Pincus,  
So I funded the company myself but I did every horrible thing in the book to, just to get 
revenues right away. I mean we gave our users poker chips if they downloaded this zwinky 
toolbar which was like, I don’t know, I downloaded it once and couldn’t get rid of it. *laughs* 
We did anything possible just to just get revenues so that we could grow and be a real 
business (Arrington, 2009, Nov. quoting from the Mark Pincus talk at Startup@Berkeley, 
2009).  
In late 2009, Journalist Michael Arrington, writing for TechCrunch, posted a series of articles on a 
topic that he referred to as ‘scamville’ or a ‘scamville ecology’, that highlighted how the three most 
popular Facebook gaming companies (Zynga, Playfish and Playdom) were making money off their 
customers in unethical ways. He described what he refers to as a typical scam that was being offered 
within these social games:  
users are offered in game currency in exchange for filling out an IQ survey. Four simple 
questions are asked. The answers are irrelevant. When the user gets to the last question they 
are told their results will be text messaged to them. They are asked to enter in their mobile 
phone number, and are texted a pin code to enter on the quiz. Once they’ve done that, 
they’ve just subscribed to a $9.99/month subscription. Tatto Media is the company at the very 
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end of the line on most mobile scams, and they flow it up through Offerpal, SuperRewards 
and others to the game developers. (Arrington, Oct 31, 2009) 
By November that year, following the series of Scamville articles, Zynga removed all “lead 
generating” ads, turning exclusively to virtual goods for revenue. However their problematic 
relationship with third parties and related data practices did not stop there.  In October 2010, Zynga 
was sued in relation to Facebook privacy and user data.  According to Paul (2010), “The company … 
was roped into a class-action lawsuit on Tuesday. The suit alleges that Zynga collected and shared 
the data of 218 million Facebook user IDs with advertisers and data brokers. The class-action lawsuit 
alleges that Zynga violated federal law and its contract with Facebook by sharing user data with third 
parties.” This is even more problematic than it seems at first glance. For while a user may have 
knowingly agreed to share their own personal data, in that process, they also granted access to 
many of their friends and acquaintances details – people who had made no such agreement with 
Zynga. This meant that not only were Zynga potentially violating the agreement they had with those 
with whom they had negotiated a direct contract according to use of data, it also included 
information about those who had not agreed to any such relationship. 
The above details problematic relationships for Facebook and Zynga with third parties and their 
gathering and sharing of personal data. However, the other side that proved problematic for 
Facebook, and in turn Zynga was their use of viral marketing methods. Social networks of users were 
spammed repeatedly by posts generated by Zynga games being placed on their (non-player) 
Facebook pages. Each time a quest was achieved, a purchase was made, a task completed by a user 
(as well as just a simple notice that a user had joined a game), posts were made on the users’ social 
connections sites. This was a highly productive way for Zynga to cross-market their various games as 
well for player (and potential consumer) recruitment purposes (Kastensmidt, 2010, p. 202). 
However, it also generated a backlash amongst Facebook users. According to Helft (2010) after 
millions of users complained, “Facebook started restricting the messages, and Zynga’s traffic 
dropped sharply. For instance, FarmVille had a 26 percent drop, to 61 million monthly users, in July 
from a peak of about 83 million in March [2010] … Zynga investors say the drop in traffic had little 
effect on revenue because many players who dropped out didn’t buy virtual goods” (Helft, 2010). 
Yet in the longer term, as Facebook distanced themselves from Zynga in part because of the 
backlash, and in part in order to encourage new game developers to populate Facebook’s app 
library, Zynga’s numbers have radically declined both via Facebook and via their own company 
website. As recently as 2015, Zynga investors sued the company claiming they failed to disclose the 
upcoming changes in their relationship with Facebook which was known to Zynga at their initial 
public offering (Geuss, 2015).  
Regardless of whether players enter via Facebook or Zynga’s own online properties, significant 
questions remain about the transparency of the exchange players are making in order to access 
these games. Though this has obvious commodification ramifications there are also potential ethical 
implications. How might one understand data trails, patterns and so forth that can be both uniquely 
personal but also broadly aggregated and depersonalised? What might the responsibilities and also 
the capacities be of those who offer services to people as a commercial endeavour seemingly for 
free but with the trade-off of the release of personal and network information without a clear 
understanding of what will happen to this (personal) information?  
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Equally important is how exactly aggregated data from player activity is covered by the Terms of 
Service: is each and every click ‘user content’, or does this refer to larger items? Following this 
question, if this aggregated activity is amalgamated with other users’ actions and insights produced, 
how meaningful is Zynga’s assertion that user content can be deleted if a Zynga account is deleted? 
Does user information get removed from the data analytics, or has it been so transformed and 
integrated that it is essentially part of Zynga’s commercial property for perpetuity? Even if it were 
possible to disaggregate a single player’s data, would this remove the insight (and value) already 
produced from analytics performed on the amalgamated data? While this sort of transaction is by no 
means unique (Google’s search engine learning from users’ search terms is comparable) the lack of 
acknowledgement about the nature and extent of this activity – and the value of player data – 
situates social games of this sort as, at the very least, disingenuous. 
Social media contradictions 
The exchange of user information, activity or attention for the provision of free platforms, 
applications and services is a widespread online business model. In this respect, Zynga’s activities 
might be considered comparable to many of their commercial peers. However, underneath the cute 
farms and growing crops, Zynga’s games appear to deliberately exacerbate the worst excesses of a 
cultural opacity, where the letter of the law might be followed – in making Terms of Service and 
Privacy Policies in some fashion available – but the way these are situated ensures that an incredibly 
low proportion of players will ever read or even think about these policies.  As Leaver and Lloyd have 
argued (2015, p. 162): 
a social media contradiction may arise where users focus on the social elements – often acts 
of communication and sharing which are thought of as ephemeral and in the moment, 
comparable to a telephone conversation – while the companies and corporations creating 
these apps are more focused on the media elements, which are measurable, aggregatable, 
can be algorithmically analysed in a variety of potentially valuable ways, and can last 
indefinitely. 
Zynga typifies this contradiction, outwardly providing a social gaming experience whilst operating as 
an analytics company, attempting to extract revenue-generating patterns and predictions from 
every click and choice players make within their games. The front-facing experience of Zynga’s 
games encourages players to focus on the social side: the play, the competition, and social 
interaction. Yet, paradoxically, for Zynga these elements are secondary to the data collection, 
aggregation, analytics and monetization of player activity either to refine the replayability of the 
games, to increase the potential for users to pay for virtual goods, to refine other approaches to 
monetisation player activity. It is not so much the business model, but the way it is effectively 
hidden from players, that makes the social media contradiction in Zynga’s games so insidious. 
Moreover, as boyd and Crawford (2012) have argued, big data is not just a technical system of 
computational tools, nor just a series of analytical processes which potentially produce useful 
insights from data at a large scale, but it also as it circulates in contemporary culture is a 
mythological process. The myth is largely that big data can, and does, produce objective truthful 
information about the present and can thus predict future activities across a range of fields. Yet, as 
Andrejevic (2014, p. 1677) aptly critiques this mythos, "Predictive analytics is not, despite the hype, 
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a crystal ball". Rather, Andrejevic argues further, big data perpetuates a further divide: not just a 
division between those who focus on games as play and communication, on one hand, and 
companies focusing on these activities as data or media generation on the other; but a further divide 
between those who have the computational and analytical tools and resources of sufficient scale to 
even attempt to analyse such vast pools of raw data, versus those who – regardless of access – lack 
the infrastructure needed to ‘ask’ big questions of it. The crystal ball of big data analytics, as it were, 
requires computational power of such a large scale, that only large companies are in a position to 
even attempt gaze into it for whatever answers they might be able to conjure.  
Conclusion 
Zynga’s empire peaked with 311 million monthly active users across all of their games the third 
quarter of 2012 but by the first quarter of 2014, however, the monthly active users was less than 
half at 123 million users (Statista, 2014). Zynga’s waning fortunes and revenues are, in part, a 
reminder of McCosker and Wilken’s (2014) important point that big data is far from self-explanatory, 
and that amassing gigantic datasets and figuring out how to analyse these for any purpose, including 
profitability, is still an extremely imprecise exercise. Regardless of success, though, the argument 
made here remains equally valid: companies whose business model relies on data mining and big 
data analytics are doing nothing intrinsically wrong if they are being transparent, or at least honest, 
about their operations, and allowing users or players to make an educated choice about whether to 
exchange the trail of their use and activity for free access to the game or service. Zynga, in 
deliberately hiding their business model from players, whilst openly touting themselves as an 
analytics company masquerading as a games developer to the business world, and investors, 
perpetuate a social media contradiction that continues to widen a divide in literacy, and trust, 
between users or players and the companies behind those games and services. 
The successor to Zynga’s crown in Facebook’s gaming options, as well as on the apps that populate a 
huge number of mobile devices, is Candy Crush Saga from King which has its own complex data 
analytics operation, but has managed to find a more sustainable business model, leveraging access 
to players’ social network connections, and cash, in exchange for more rapidly progressing through 
various levels. Notably, Candy Crush has been linked to the mechanics of gambling (Gardner, 2014; 
Smith, 2014) while gambling is also one of Zynga’s largest current areas of development (Albarrán 
Torres and Goggin, 2014). Zynga, King and other social and casual games developers continue to 
leverage complex data analytics to refine their offerings to sustain player interest and to maximise 
the odds of them parting with money to further their progress. However, as this article has 
demonstrated with the example of Zynga and Farmville, there is an onus on companies to be more 
transparent about their practices, to explain how individual data might be used and ensure players 
can make an informed choice about whether they wish to trade a complex history of their every click 
using a game for access to it. Beyond the realm of gaming, big data analytics have become 
increasingly core elements and drivers for decisions about everything from fitness to transport and a 
hundreds of other fields, often in extremely useful ways (Mayer-Schönberger and  Cukier, 2013). Yet 
if the aggregation of individual activity is so often going to be recorded, encoded, aggregated and 
analysed, the individuals generating that big data should, at the very least, have a right to know that 
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